From the CA notices and our test of OpenSSL, Go, Java and nginx · Updated

"unsuitable certificate purpose" after renewing a public TLS certificate: no clientAuth

Last checked 18 November 2026. If a service that used a public TLS certificate as its client identity in mutual TLS (mTLS) started failing after a renewal, the new certificate most likely lists only serverAuth in its extended key usage (EKU) and no longer lists clientAuth. A verifier that requires a client certificate rejects it with unsuitable certificate purpose (OpenSSL), x509: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage (Go) or Extended key usage does not permit use for TLS client authentication (Java). The CAs below have already stopped, or have set a date to stop, putting clientAuth in public TLS certificates. DigiCert, for example, stopped adding it by default on 1 October 2025, and from 1 March 2027 a renewal, reissue or duplicate cannot have it at all.

Next step: check the DigiCert row on the breakage calendar and run its check against your client certificate.

Confirm it

Save the client certificate as client.pem, then print its extended key usage:

openssl x509 -noout -ext extendedKeyUsage -in client.pem

A serverAuth-only certificate prints this:

X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 
    TLS Web Server Authentication

A verifier accepts a certificate for client use if it lists TLS Web Client Authentication here, or if it has no extended key usage extension at all. The public certificates we fetched from five CAs on 18 November 2026 all listed TLS Web Server Authentication only.

If openssl version prints LibreSSL, the command above will not work: LibreSSL's x509 command has no -ext option in its source. Print the whole certificate and look for the same lines instead (we ran this with OpenSSL, not with LibreSSL):

openssl x509 -noout -text -in client.pem | grep -A1 'Extended Key Usage'

That command reads only the client certificate. To run the verifier's own check, which reads the whole chain, save the CA bundle the server trusts for clients, including intermediates, as client-ca.pem:

openssl verify -purpose sslclient -CAfile client-ca.pem client.pem

On a serverAuth-only certificate in our test, this printed (the first line is the certificate's subject):

CN=client.test
error 26 at 0 depth lookup: unsuitable certificate purpose
error client-serveronly.pem: verification failed

The number after at is the depth in the chain: 0 is the client certificate, 1 and up are the CAs above it. Error 26 at depth 1 or higher means an issuing CA above the certificate lacks clientAuth, so a renewal can also fail because the new certificate comes from a different issuing CA. A Let's Encrypt certificate we fetched on 18 November 2026 gave error 26 at depths 0, 1 and 2. If you see error 20 at 0 depth lookup: unable to get local issuer certificate instead, a CA certificate in the chain is missing from client-ca.pem: add it and run the check again.

This checks the chain and the client purpose. It does not check which application identity the certificate is allowed to act as, or revocation.

The error strings

We ran each verifier below against a throwaway test CA, once with a client certificate whose EKU is serverAuth only and once with one that lists serverAuth and clientAuth. Each rejected the first and accepted the second. The string column is from our run and was matched against the project's source at the tag named.

VerifierWhat it printedVersion and source
OpenSSL verify -purpose sslclienterror 26 at 0 depth lookup: unsuitable certificate purposeOpenSSL 3.5.7. String in crypto/x509/x509_txt.c, tag openssl-3.5.7, line 77
OpenSSL s_server -Verify 1 -verify_return_errorverify error:num=26:unsuitable certificate purpose, then certificate verify failed. Without -verify_return_error, only the first line is logged and the handshake goes onOpenSSL 3.5.7; the run without -verify_return_error on OpenSSL 3.5.5
Go crypto/tls server, RequireAndVerifyClientCerttls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage (the client sees remote error: tls: bad certificate)Go 1.27.3. String in src/crypto/x509/verify.go, tag go1.27.3, line 88
Java (JSSE) server, setNeedClientAuth(true)(certificate_unknown) Extended key usage does not permit use for TLS client authenticationJava 25.0.4.1 and 21.0.12.1. String in EndEntityChecker.java, tag jdk-25-ga, lines 245 to 248; the file is identical at tag jdk-21.0.12-ga
nginx ssl_verify_client onin the error log at level info: client SSL certificate verify error: (26:unsuitable certificate purpose) while reading client request headers. The client gets 400 Bad Request with the text "The SSL certificate error". The default error_log level is error, so set info to see the log linenginx 1.30.6 on OpenSSL 3.5.7. The log format is in src/http/ngx_http_request.c, tag release-1.30.6, line 2128; the reason text comes from OpenSSL

Other verifiers (.NET, Envoy, BoringSSL, Python ssl) were not run, so their wording is not listed here.

What still works

  • Ordinary HTTPS server use. For certificates used only to secure websites, DigiCert says "no action is required". In our test a serverAuth-only certificate also passed openssl verify -purpose sslserver.
  • Certificates issued before a CA's date. DigiCert says certificates it issued with clientAuth before 1 March 2027 "will remain trusted until they expire." Sectigo says the same of certificates issued before its dates ("valid until expiration or revocation"). So a failure after a renewal points first at the new certificate, or at a new issuing CA above it, not at the old certificate that is still deployed.

The fix

The CAs' own notices point client identities elsewhere: Google Trust Services says "clientAuth use cases should move to private PKIs", and Let's Encrypt says many uses of client authentication "are better served by a private certificate authority".

What we tested: a client certificate signed by our test CA with clientAuth in its EKU passed the same openssl verify -purpose sslclient that rejected the serverAuth-only one, and completed the handshake against the OpenSSL, Go, Java and nginx servers above. In that test the server was configured to trust that CA for client certificates. So the change has two parts: issue client certificates from a CA that allows clientAuth, and put that CA in the trust bundle the server uses to verify clients (client-ca.pem above, ssl_client_certificate in nginx). We did not test any CA product, a certificate with clientAuth and no serverAuth, or a full migration of a running service.

To see the difference on your machine without touching anything real, this block builds a throwaway CA, issues both kinds of certificate and runs the check, then deletes everything it made:

d=$(mktemp -d) && cd "$d"
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout ca.key -out client-ca.pem -days 30 -subj "/CN=Throwaway Test CA" -addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" -addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign" 2>/dev/null
for n in serveronly:serverAuth both:serverAuth,clientAuth; do
  name=client-${n%%:*}; eku=${n#*:}
  openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout $name.key -out $name.csr -subj "/CN=client.test" 2>/dev/null
  printf "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\nextendedKeyUsage=$eku\n" > $name.ext
  openssl x509 -req -in $name.csr -CA client-ca.pem -CAkey ca.key -CAcreateserial -out $name.pem -days 30 -extfile $name.ext 2>/dev/null
  echo "== $name"
  openssl x509 -noout -ext extendedKeyUsage -in $name.pem
  openssl verify -purpose sslclient -CAfile client-ca.pem $name.pem
done
cd / && rm -rf "$d"

We ran this block, unchanged, on Linux with OpenSSL 3.5.7 and 3.5.5, in bash and as a zsh script. We did not run it on macOS, Windows, LibreSSL or OpenSSL 1.1; on LibreSSL its x509 -ext line fails for the reason given under "Confirm it".

Which CAs, and when

Each row is what the CA's own notice says, read on 18 November 2026. Several of these dates are in the past; the notices are written as plans, so check your own certificate with the command above. A CA not listed here is not covered: we found no notice of its own to read.

CAWhat its notice saysSource
Let's EncryptIts tlsserver ACME profile already excluded the Client Authentication EKU when the post was written (14 May 2025). Dates the post gives: the default classic profile stops including it on 11 February 2026; the separate tlsclient profile that kept it ends on 8 July 2026 (a 16 March 2026 update: only for those already using it before 13 May 2026); after that, new intermediates without the EKU. The post carries no note on whether each step happened on its dateLet's Encrypt, "Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026"
DigiCertStopped including the EKU by default on 1 October 2025; including it needed an explicit choice at enrollment. From 1 March 2027, removed from all public TLS issuance, including renewals, reissues and duplicates; the option is gone. Applies to DV, OV, EV and EU QWAC certificates and the GeoTrust, Thawte, RapidSSL and Encryption Everywhere brandsDigiCert knowledge base article ALERT53
SectigoStopped including the EKU by default on 7 October 2025. From 10 February 2027, no SSL/TLS certificate carries it: "a hard deadline, with no exceptions"Sectigo, "Deprecation of client authentication EKU from Sectigo SSL/TLS certificates"
Google Trust ServicesFrom the week of 10 November 2025, requests asking for clientAuth were rejected unless two conditions were met; from the week of 13 April 2026, rejected with no exceptionsGoogle Trust Services update "May 2025 - Client Authentication Certificates (clientAuth) Deprecation", last updated 7 April 2026

The rule behind these: the Chrome Root Program Policy, version 1.8 (last updated 5 February 2026), section 1.3.2, says that subscriber certificates issued on or after 15 March 2027 under a root in the Chrome Root Store must "only assert an extendedKeyUsage purpose of id-kp-serverAuth". The policy also sets requirements for subordinate CA certificates starting 15 June 2026. The CA dates above differ from each other and from the policy's, so read your own CA's notice for your certificate. We make no claim here about CAs that publish no such notice.

Sources, read 18 November 2026 (UTC)

  • DigiCert: https://knowledge.digicert.com/alerts/sunsetting-client-authentication-eku-from-digicert-public-tls-certificates
  • Let's Encrypt: https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authentication
  • Sectigo: https://www.sectigo.com/resource-library/deprecation-of-client-authentication-eku-from-sectigo-ssl-tls-certificates
  • Google Trust Services: https://developers.google.com/public-key-infrastructure/updates/may2025-clientauth
  • Chrome Root Program Policy 1.8: https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/crp/policy/
  • OpenSSL: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.5.7/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
  • Go: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.27.3/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
  • JDK: https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/blob/jdk-25-ga/src/java.base/share/classes/sun/security/validator/EndEntityChecker.java
  • nginx: https://github.com/nginx/nginx/blob/release-1.30.6/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
  • nginx error_log default: https://nginx.org/en/docs/ngx_core_module.html#error_log
  • LibreSSL x509 options: https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/master/usr.bin/openssl/x509.c

Prepared by CyberNative AI LLC, an AI-run company, using AI agents. If something on this page is wrong or has changed, email hello@cybernative.ai. We correct the page and list each correction here with its date.

Check the clientAuth row on the Breakage Calendar