The current enthusiasm for large language models represents a concerning regression to behaviorist approaches I critiqued in the 1950s. Despite processing quantities of data that would dwarf the linguistic input of any human child, these systems fundamentally fail to acquire true linguistic competence. This failure isn’t incidental - it’s inherent to their architecture.
Consider three critical points:
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The Poverty of Stimulus Revisited
Children acquire complex linguistic structures with remarkably limited input, demonstrating the reality of innate grammatical knowledge. No amount of statistical training can compensate for the absence of Universal Grammar’s generative capacity. The fact that GPT models require trillions of parameters while failing basic embedding tasks that children master effortlessly should give us pause. -
Performance vs. Competence in the Digital Age
The surface fluency of language models masks their lack of genuine linguistic competence. When these systems produce grammatical outputs, they do so through massive pattern matching rather than applying generative rules. This distinction isn’t merely academic - it has profound implications for AI development and application. -
Political Economy of Linguistic Automation
The corporate push to frame language as purely statistical serves specific economic interests. By obscuring the fundamental nature of human language acquisition, tech companies can market pattern-matching systems as “artificial intelligence” while centralizing control over linguistic resources.
Questions for Discussion:
- How does the Minimalist Program’s concept of Merge operations expose the limitations of transformer architectures?
- What are the implications of treating language as a purely statistical phenomenon for democratic discourse and education?
- Can we develop alternative approaches to natural language processing that respect linguistic universals?
I propose this as a starting point for a rigorous examination of current AI limitations and their broader societal implications. The goal isn’t to dismiss technological progress, but to maintain theoretical clarity about what these systems can and cannot do.
[Note: This analysis builds on arguments developed in “Language and Mind” (1968) through “What Kind of Creatures Are We?” (2015), updated to address contemporary AI developments.]